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﻿Foreword
Introductions﻿to﻿books﻿such﻿as﻿this﻿one﻿very﻿often﻿include﻿proclamations﻿that﻿“this﻿is﻿a﻿timely﻿volume”,﻿
to﻿the﻿extent﻿that﻿the﻿phrase﻿becomes﻿something﻿of﻿a﻿cliché.﻿In﻿this﻿case,﻿however,﻿it﻿is﻿absolutely﻿true.﻿
The﻿themes﻿and﻿topics﻿covered﻿by﻿this﻿book﻿bear﻿directly﻿on﻿our﻿understanding﻿of,﻿and﻿reactions﻿to,﻿
events﻿that﻿have﻿an﻿ongoing,﻿significant﻿and﻿sustained﻿impact﻿on﻿the﻿world﻿in﻿which﻿we﻿live.
Formal﻿definitions﻿of﻿‘cyber﻿security’﻿typically﻿revolve﻿around﻿systems,﻿standards,﻿technologies﻿and﻿
processes﻿for﻿protecting﻿computer﻿systems,﻿networks﻿and﻿the﻿data﻿they﻿contain﻿from﻿unauthorised﻿access﻿
or﻿malicious﻿attacks.﻿Such﻿a﻿definition﻿may﻿imply﻿that﻿cyber﻿security﻿is﻿somewhat﻿of﻿a﻿dry,﻿technically﻿
focused﻿enterprise,﻿mainly﻿of﻿concern﻿to﻿computer﻿scientists﻿and﻿industry﻿professionals.﻿That﻿is﻿a﻿long﻿
way﻿from﻿the﻿truth:﻿cyber﻿security,﻿and﻿security﻿violations,﻿have﻿profound﻿implications﻿for﻿all﻿of﻿us.
We﻿now﻿live﻿in﻿a﻿world﻿where﻿all﻿manner﻿of﻿devices,﻿services﻿and﻿the﻿people﻿who﻿use﻿them﻿are﻿net-
worked﻿and﻿vulnerable﻿to﻿electronic﻿attack.﻿These﻿range﻿from﻿obvious﻿targets﻿like﻿traditional﻿computer﻿
and﻿telecommunications﻿systems,﻿to﻿nuclear﻿reactors,﻿children’s﻿toys﻿and﻿domestic﻿appliances.﻿All﻿may﻿be﻿
threatened﻿or﻿exploited﻿in﻿different﻿ways.﻿As﻿our﻿reliance﻿on﻿communication﻿technologies﻿and﻿networked﻿
devices﻿inexorably﻿grows,﻿cyber﻿security﻿will﻿become﻿more﻿and﻿more﻿critical﻿to﻿society.
At﻿ the﻿ time﻿when﻿ this﻿book﻿was﻿being﻿written,﻿various﻿aspects﻿of﻿cyber﻿ security﻿were﻿ rarely﻿ far﻿
from﻿the﻿headlines.﻿Businesses﻿and﻿public﻿services﻿including﻿hospitals,﻿were﻿crippled﻿by﻿ransomware﻿
attacks.﻿Online﻿fraud﻿was﻿rampant,﻿with﻿costs﻿to﻿economies﻿and﻿individuals﻿that﻿are﻿hard﻿to﻿quantify.﻿In﻿
a﻿number﻿of﻿countries,﻿there﻿were﻿allegations﻿that﻿foreign﻿states﻿had﻿hacked﻿political﻿campaign﻿organisa-
tions,﻿resulting﻿in﻿the﻿theft﻿and﻿publication﻿of﻿emails﻿for﻿political﻿purposes.﻿There﻿were﻿accusations﻿of﻿
meddling﻿in﻿multiple﻿elections﻿by﻿electronic﻿means.﻿There﻿were﻿frequent﻿concerns﻿about﻿online﻿influ-
ence﻿leading﻿to﻿political﻿and﻿religious﻿extremism,﻿and﻿the﻿use﻿of﻿telecommunications﻿and﻿networks﻿by﻿
terrorists,﻿criminals﻿and﻿national﻿security﻿agencies.﻿Loss,﻿theft,﻿and﻿publication﻿of﻿personal﻿information﻿
were﻿depressingly﻿frequent,﻿ranging﻿from﻿the﻿personal﻿photos﻿of﻿celebrities﻿to﻿very﻿large﻿scale﻿losses﻿of﻿
personal﻿data﻿and﻿breaches﻿of﻿confidentiality﻿by﻿public﻿and﻿private﻿organisations.﻿Whether﻿directly﻿or﻿
indirectly,﻿issues﻿such﻿as﻿these﻿touched﻿all﻿of﻿our﻿lives.
In﻿any﻿technical﻿field,﻿ there﻿is﻿a﻿ tendency﻿to﻿prioritise﻿ technical﻿approaches﻿to﻿solving﻿problems.﻿
However,﻿hardware﻿and﻿software﻿engineering﻿can﻿only﻿ever﻿be﻿part﻿of﻿the﻿solution﻿to﻿cyber﻿security.﻿
Since﻿the﻿days﻿of﻿the﻿earliest﻿computer﻿hackers,﻿it﻿has﻿been﻿known﻿that﻿the﻿human﻿element﻿is﻿among﻿the﻿
weakest﻿components﻿in﻿any﻿system.﻿The﻿use﻿of﻿‘social﻿engineering’﻿techniques﻿(manipulating﻿people﻿in﻿
various﻿ways﻿to﻿gain﻿access﻿to﻿secure﻿computer﻿systems)﻿was,﻿and﻿remains,﻿a﻿key﻿weapon﻿in﻿the﻿arsenal﻿
of﻿those﻿who﻿seek﻿to﻿illegitimately﻿access﻿or﻿attack﻿the﻿systems,﻿services﻿and﻿infrastructure﻿underpin-
ning﻿many﻿aspects﻿of﻿modern﻿life.
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Humans﻿will﻿always﻿interact﻿with﻿any﻿information﻿system﻿at﻿some﻿level,﻿and﻿human﻿behaviour﻿thus﻿
becomes﻿a﻿part﻿of﻿the﻿system.﻿And﻿of﻿course,﻿a﻿human﻿actor﻿is﻿always﻿the﻿instigator﻿of﻿any﻿attack﻿upon﻿
a﻿system.﻿It﻿is﻿therefore﻿imperative﻿to﻿understand﻿how﻿people﻿interact﻿with﻿the﻿technologies﻿at﻿hand,﻿and﻿
what﻿individual﻿behaviours﻿may﻿introduce﻿vulnerabilities.﻿For﻿example,﻿what﻿factors﻿might﻿make﻿some﻿
individuals﻿or﻿organisations﻿more﻿susceptible﻿to﻿malicious﻿influence?﻿How﻿do﻿psychological﻿phenomena﻿
and﻿information﻿technologies﻿mediate,﻿underpin﻿or﻿facilitate﻿such﻿processes﻿of﻿influence?﻿What﻿can﻿be﻿
done﻿to﻿protect﻿individuals,﻿groups﻿and﻿systems﻿from﻿such﻿attacks?﻿These﻿questions﻿are﻿clearly﻿in﻿the﻿
domain﻿of﻿psychology﻿and﻿the﻿behavioural﻿sciences.﻿Without﻿considering﻿them,﻿no﻿approach﻿to﻿cyber﻿
security﻿can﻿ever﻿be﻿successful.
This﻿collection﻿of﻿chapters﻿deals﻿with﻿several﻿key﻿themes﻿around﻿the﻿intersection﻿of﻿psychology﻿and﻿
cyber﻿security.﻿One﻿of﻿the﻿areas﻿explored﻿is﻿individual﻿decision﻿making﻿in﻿online﻿environments,﻿which﻿
leads﻿to﻿the﻿considerations﻿of﻿privacy﻿protection﻿behaviour,﻿trust﻿formation﻿and﻿individual﻿cyber﻿security﻿
concerns﻿affecting﻿consumer﻿behaviour﻿and﻿ultimately﻿victimisation.﻿Next,﻿a﻿number﻿of﻿phenomena﻿
relevant﻿to﻿cyber﻿security﻿on﻿a﻿global﻿level﻿are﻿addressed.﻿In﻿particular,﻿this﻿volume﻿investigates﻿how﻿
culture﻿and﻿religion﻿might﻿impact﻿upon﻿security,﻿arguing﻿that﻿cyber﻿security﻿measures﻿and﻿technology﻿
acceptance﻿are﻿affected﻿by﻿individual﻿cultural﻿differences.﻿The﻿discussion﻿delves﻿into﻿the﻿issues﻿connected﻿
to﻿online﻿radicalisation﻿and﻿cyber﻿terrorism﻿reflecting﻿the﻿currency﻿of﻿this﻿volume﻿in﻿light﻿of﻿the﻿recent﻿
attacks﻿worldwide﻿and﻿the﻿pressing﻿need﻿to﻿bring﻿this﻿phenomenon﻿to﻿an﻿end.﻿Cyber﻿security﻿professionals﻿
often﻿say﻿that﻿we﻿can﻿never﻿achieve﻿a﻿perfect﻿cyber﻿security﻿posture.﻿The﻿risk﻿of﻿cyber﻿security﻿threats﻿
rather﻿is﻿said﻿to﻿be﻿minimised﻿through﻿the﻿application﻿of﻿protective﻿mechanisms﻿and﻿security﻿controls.﻿
The﻿discussion﻿of﻿cyber﻿security﻿will﻿not﻿be﻿complete﻿without﻿addressing﻿two﻿key﻿elements﻿in﻿this:﻿how﻿
can﻿we﻿educate﻿and﻿motivate﻿individuals﻿to﻿behave﻿in﻿a﻿way﻿that﻿reduces﻿risk?
Drawing﻿on﻿up-to-date﻿research﻿findings,﻿each﻿chapter﻿addresses﻿key﻿practical﻿and﻿theoretical﻿issues﻿
in﻿a﻿variety﻿of﻿important﻿applied﻿contexts.﻿The﻿questions﻿addressed﻿here﻿are﻿not﻿just﻿of﻿academic﻿interest;﻿
they﻿have﻿critical﻿implications﻿for﻿the﻿security﻿of﻿our﻿society.﻿Taken﻿together,﻿these﻿chapters﻿provide﻿an﻿
excellent﻿overview﻿of﻿current﻿research﻿and﻿thinking﻿across﻿a﻿broad﻿spectrum﻿of﻿cyber﻿security-related﻿
issues﻿and﻿behavioural﻿phenomena.﻿They﻿will﻿prove﻿a﻿valuable﻿resource﻿both﻿for﻿those﻿working﻿in﻿the﻿
behavioural﻿sciences,﻿and﻿those﻿with﻿a﻿more﻿technical﻿focus.﻿It﻿is﻿only﻿by﻿different﻿disciplines﻿working﻿
together﻿across﻿that﻿boundary﻿that﻿risk﻿can﻿be﻿reduced﻿and﻿security﻿enhanced.
Tom Buchanan
University of Westminster, UK
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Researchers﻿in﻿a﻿variety﻿of﻿disciplines﻿turn﻿to﻿psychology﻿to﻿help﻿understand﻿human﻿behaviour﻿and﻿deci-
sion﻿making.﻿Psychology﻿has﻿a﻿long﻿history﻿of﻿understanding﻿human﻿behaviour,﻿thoughts﻿and﻿actions.﻿By﻿
applying﻿that﻿research﻿and﻿theoretical﻿knowledge﻿to﻿the﻿topic﻿of﻿cyber﻿security,﻿academics﻿and﻿practitio-
ners﻿may﻿be﻿able﻿to﻿better﻿understand﻿why﻿and﻿when﻿people﻿engage﻿in﻿cyberattacks.﻿Such﻿knowledge﻿is﻿
useful﻿to﻿those﻿in﻿law﻿enforcement﻿and﻿policy.﻿It﻿is﻿also﻿crucial﻿to﻿those﻿working﻿in﻿organisations﻿who﻿
try﻿to﻿keep﻿their﻿companies﻿safe.
Threats﻿can﻿come﻿from﻿inside﻿the﻿organisation﻿or﻿from﻿outside.﻿Insider﻿threats﻿pose﻿a﻿particularly﻿
difficult﻿challenge﻿as﻿one﻿has﻿to﻿monitor﻿who﻿may﻿be﻿a﻿threat﻿and﻿to﻿some﻿extent﻿why﻿they﻿are﻿a﻿threat﻿at﻿
any﻿given﻿time.﻿To﻿know﻿that,﻿we﻿must﻿rely﻿on﻿psychology﻿to﻿help﻿us﻿analyse﻿human﻿behaviour.﻿Without﻿
a﻿foundation﻿in﻿how﻿to﻿better﻿understand﻿human﻿behaviour,﻿we﻿could﻿be﻿at﻿a﻿loss﻿to﻿predict﻿who﻿may﻿be﻿
an﻿inside﻿threat.
Outside﻿threats﻿are﻿in﻿some﻿ways﻿easier﻿to﻿understand﻿and﻿many﻿cyber﻿threats﻿originating﻿outside﻿
an﻿organisation﻿require﻿no﻿assistance﻿from﻿insiders.﻿There﻿is﻿only﻿so﻿much﻿technology﻿can﻿do﻿to﻿keep﻿
corporations﻿safe.﻿As﻿good﻿as﻿the﻿technology﻿is,﻿humans﻿are﻿adept﻿thinkers﻿and﻿will﻿be﻿able﻿to﻿navigate﻿
a﻿way﻿around﻿most﻿security﻿systems.﻿That﻿is﻿not﻿to﻿say﻿that﻿anyone﻿could﻿do﻿so,﻿but﻿those﻿who﻿have﻿
a﻿knack﻿for﻿it﻿and﻿are﻿so﻿inclined﻿could﻿breach﻿the﻿security.﻿Those﻿who﻿are﻿less﻿skilled﻿but﻿equally﻿as﻿
motivated,﻿may﻿be﻿able﻿to﻿pay﻿someone﻿to﻿breach﻿the﻿organisation’s﻿security.
Concepts﻿such﻿as﻿trust﻿and﻿relationship﻿development﻿are﻿relevant﻿to﻿this﻿work.﻿Psychology﻿has﻿long﻿
studied﻿these﻿ideas﻿and﻿can﻿contribute﻿a﻿significant﻿ literature﻿to﻿them.﻿For﻿example,﻿ in﻿ trust﻿studies,﻿
psychological﻿research﻿has﻿investigated﻿how﻿the﻿concept﻿is﻿developed,﻿and﻿how﻿it﻿is﻿fostered.﻿It﻿looks﻿
at﻿what﻿leads﻿to﻿a﻿breakdown﻿in﻿trust﻿in﻿dyads﻿as﻿well﻿as﻿in﻿larger﻿group﻿settings.﻿Through﻿this﻿sort﻿of﻿
research,﻿we﻿may﻿be﻿able﻿to﻿apply﻿it﻿and﻿develop﻿a﻿greater﻿understanding﻿towards﻿how﻿hacking﻿groups﻿
are﻿formed﻿and﻿rely﻿on﻿each﻿other﻿to﻿breach﻿a﻿security﻿wall.﻿We﻿may﻿also﻿use﻿it﻿to﻿try﻿to﻿mitigate﻿such﻿
violations﻿by﻿developing﻿interventions﻿to﻿build﻿trust﻿within﻿an﻿organisation﻿or﻿between﻿the﻿organisation﻿
and﻿potential﻿outside﻿hackers.
Similarly,﻿we﻿may﻿rely﻿on﻿psychological﻿research﻿in﻿relationship﻿development.﻿We﻿could﻿look﻿at﻿how﻿
relationships﻿are﻿created﻿and﻿who﻿wants﻿to﻿be﻿part﻿of﻿certain﻿relationships.﻿We﻿could﻿look﻿for﻿weaknesses﻿
in﻿relationships﻿and﻿what﻿holds﻿people﻿together.﻿Understanding﻿why﻿certain﻿people﻿are﻿drawn﻿to﻿others,﻿
what﻿motivates﻿groups﻿to﻿form﻿and﻿to﻿have﻿a﻿particular﻿agenda,﻿is﻿all﻿crucial﻿in﻿considering﻿security﻿of﻿
cyber﻿systems.
Aspects﻿of﻿disinhibition﻿and﻿anonymity﻿in﻿the﻿online﻿setting﻿need﻿to﻿be﻿considered﻿as﻿well.﻿Disin-
hibition﻿has﻿been﻿studied﻿in﻿psychology﻿since﻿at﻿least﻿the﻿1960s.﻿Addressing﻿what﻿increases﻿people’s﻿
chances﻿of﻿acting﻿in﻿a﻿particular﻿circumstance﻿or﻿failing﻿to﻿act﻿in﻿others﻿is﻿not﻿new﻿to﻿the﻿field.﻿What﻿
xvii
Preface
is﻿new,﻿however,﻿is﻿looking﻿to﻿see﻿how﻿that﻿research﻿and﻿those﻿findings﻿may﻿be﻿applied﻿to﻿the﻿online﻿
environment.﻿What﻿features﻿about﻿individual﻿differences﻿may﻿increase﻿someone’s﻿chances﻿of﻿using﻿the﻿
internet﻿to﻿engage﻿or﻿encourage﻿terrorism?﻿What﻿might﻿make﻿an﻿individual﻿think﻿about﻿why﻿s/he﻿should﻿
use﻿online﻿media﻿for﻿a﻿social﻿protest﻿or﻿choose﻿to﻿protest﻿in﻿a﻿more﻿traditional﻿way,﻿or﻿not﻿at﻿all?﻿Theories﻿
and﻿research﻿in﻿social﻿psychology﻿have﻿studied﻿why﻿people﻿may﻿be﻿inhibited﻿or﻿disinhibited﻿to﻿act﻿in﻿
certain﻿ways;﻿these﻿book﻿chapters﻿are﻿able﻿to﻿use﻿that﻿foundation﻿as﻿a﻿cornerstone﻿to﻿better﻿explore﻿how﻿
the﻿human﻿agent﻿is﻿relevant﻿in﻿cyber﻿security.
Anonymity﻿is﻿an﻿interesting﻿concept﻿to﻿consider﻿both﻿in﻿psychology﻿and﻿cyber﻿security.﻿We﻿know﻿
from﻿psychology﻿that﻿in﻿large﻿groups﻿when﻿people﻿feel﻿that﻿they﻿cannot﻿be﻿identified﻿(that﻿is,﻿they﻿are﻿
anonymous)﻿they﻿are﻿more﻿likely﻿to﻿engage﻿in﻿risky﻿behaviour.﻿It﻿is﻿possible,﻿therefore,﻿that﻿we﻿would﻿
expect﻿that﻿sort﻿of﻿behaviour﻿in﻿the﻿online﻿environment﻿where﻿identity﻿may﻿be﻿protected.﻿The﻿importance﻿
of﻿this﻿to﻿cyber﻿security﻿is﻿not﻿to﻿be﻿considered﻿lightly.﻿If﻿techno-savvy﻿people﻿can﻿protect﻿their﻿identity,﻿
this﻿leaves﻿a﻿vulnerable﻿online﻿environment﻿rife﻿for﻿infiltration.﻿Infiltration﻿could﻿come﻿from﻿multiple﻿
sources﻿as﻿many﻿of﻿these﻿chapters﻿attest﻿to.﻿The﻿insider﻿threat,﻿especially﻿if﻿the﻿culprit﻿could﻿remain﻿
anonymous,﻿is﻿undoubtedly﻿of﻿concern.﻿The﻿hackers﻿or﻿those﻿who﻿are﻿simply﻿interested﻿in﻿breaching﻿
cyber﻿security﻿for﻿the﻿thrill﻿of﻿it﻿with﻿low﻿risk﻿of﻿getting﻿caught﻿may﻿feel﻿a﻿challenge﻿waiting.﻿Engaging﻿
in﻿social﻿protest﻿again﻿with﻿a﻿low﻿cost﻿as﻿the﻿methods﻿of﻿finding﻿the﻿perpetrator﻿are﻿not﻿well﻿established﻿
could﻿lead﻿to﻿those﻿with﻿only﻿minor﻿grievances﻿to﻿consider﻿violating﻿the﻿security﻿wall.﻿More﻿structured﻿
groups﻿who﻿wish﻿to﻿see﻿a﻿corporation’s﻿downfall﻿are﻿able﻿to﻿spend﻿the﻿time,﻿effort﻿and﻿energy﻿to﻿develop﻿
a﻿well-planned﻿security﻿breach.﻿They﻿may﻿be﻿able﻿to﻿call﻿on﻿outsiders﻿to﻿help,﻿again﻿as﻿the﻿prospect﻿of﻿
remaining﻿unknown﻿is﻿substantial.
Ethics﻿is﻿another﻿area﻿where﻿psychology﻿has﻿spent﻿a﻿fair﻿amount﻿of﻿time﻿trying﻿to﻿consider﻿how﻿to﻿
understand﻿human﻿behaviour﻿from﻿a﻿theoretical﻿perspective﻿whilst﻿also﻿ensuring﻿that﻿human﻿rights﻿are﻿
not﻿violated.﻿In﻿doing﻿so﻿it﻿provides﻿a﻿good﻿cornerstone﻿to﻿address﻿cyber﻿security﻿from﻿multiple﻿angles.﻿
First,﻿by﻿considering﻿the﻿research﻿that﻿has﻿been﻿done﻿to﻿understand﻿human﻿behaviour,﻿someone﻿looking﻿
at﻿violations﻿of﻿cyber﻿security﻿can﻿rely﻿on﻿solid﻿design﻿with﻿ethical﻿guidelines﻿fully﻿considered.﻿From﻿
the﻿organisation’s﻿viewpoint,﻿second,﻿a﻿foundation﻿in﻿psychology﻿can﻿help﻿to﻿guide﻿strict﻿approaches﻿to﻿
prevent﻿breaches﻿while﻿still﻿mainly﻿an﻿ethically﻿appropriate﻿approach﻿to﻿employees﻿and﻿those﻿who﻿use﻿
and﻿interact﻿with﻿the﻿organisation.﻿Third,﻿company﻿may﻿consider,﻿again﻿ethically,﻿how﻿to﻿prevent﻿security﻿
breaches﻿whilst﻿maintaining﻿a﻿usable﻿online﻿platform.
Using﻿these﻿concepts﻿as﻿well﻿as﻿other﻿aspects﻿that﻿are﻿cornerstones﻿of﻿psychological﻿research﻿we﻿can﻿
see﻿how﻿it﻿is﻿a﻿crucial﻿field﻿to﻿consider﻿when﻿looking﻿at﻿cyber﻿security.﻿Human﻿behaviour﻿is﻿at﻿fault﻿for﻿a﻿
number﻿of﻿security﻿violations,﻿especially﻿if﻿the﻿technology﻿becomes﻿more﻿and﻿more﻿robust.﻿Relying﻿on﻿
well﻿evidenced﻿and﻿well﻿researched﻿concepts﻿within﻿human﻿behaviour,﻿we﻿see﻿how﻿the﻿human﻿element﻿
is﻿a﻿base﻿to﻿understand﻿and﻿mitigate﻿intrusions﻿in﻿cyber﻿security.
This﻿book﻿covers﻿a﻿variety﻿of﻿topics﻿and﻿addresses﻿different﻿challenges﻿that﻿have﻿emerged﻿in﻿response﻿
to﻿changes﻿in﻿the﻿ways﻿in﻿which﻿it﻿is﻿possible﻿to﻿study﻿various﻿areas﻿of﻿decision﻿making,﻿behaviour﻿and﻿
human﻿interaction﻿in﻿relation﻿to﻿cyber﻿security.
Each﻿of﻿the﻿chapters﻿brings﻿its﻿own﻿contribution﻿on﻿how﻿psychology﻿furthers﻿our﻿understanding﻿of﻿
cyber﻿security.﻿The﻿innovative﻿chapters﻿link﻿a﻿strong﻿foundation﻿in﻿human﻿behaviour﻿research﻿with﻿ap-
plication﻿to﻿a﻿topic﻿of﻿crucial﻿importance﻿in﻿today’s﻿world.﻿By﻿looking﻿at﻿the﻿chapters﻿(see﻿descriptions﻿
below)﻿it﻿should﻿be﻿clear﻿how﻿this﻿topic﻿is﻿of﻿the﻿utmost﻿importance﻿in﻿today’s﻿world.﻿Understanding﻿
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cyber﻿security﻿and﻿breaches﻿in﻿it﻿can﻿only﻿help﻿to﻿make﻿all﻿of﻿us﻿safer.﻿Looking﻿at﻿ways﻿to﻿protect﻿our﻿
finances,﻿our﻿images﻿stored﻿online﻿and﻿companies﻿protected﻿data,﻿helps﻿us﻿all.﻿Considering﻿research﻿on﻿
psychology﻿and﻿cultural﻿identity﻿may﻿help﻿us﻿in﻿understanding﻿who﻿and﻿in﻿what﻿circumstances﻿someone﻿
may﻿decide﻿to﻿encroach﻿on﻿secure﻿systems.
In﻿a﻿world﻿as﻿complex﻿and﻿fast﻿moving﻿technologically﻿as﻿one﻿in﻿which﻿we﻿find﻿ourselves,﻿a﻿reference﻿
book﻿such﻿as﻿this﻿is﻿a﻿must.﻿It﻿provides﻿the﻿foundation﻿of﻿understanding﻿aspects﻿of﻿human﻿behaviour﻿
coupled﻿with﻿an﻿area﻿of﻿real﻿concern﻿criminologically.﻿It﻿is﻿necessary﻿at﻿this﻿juncture﻿of﻿technology﻿and﻿
human﻿behaviour﻿to﻿understand﻿who,﻿when﻿and﻿why﻿people﻿might﻿breach﻿security﻿systems.﻿Who﻿are﻿the﻿
players﻿most﻿likely﻿to﻿do﻿this﻿and﻿what﻿can﻿the﻿authorities,﻿policymakers﻿and﻿organisations﻿themselves﻿
do﻿to﻿mitigate﻿these﻿threats?﻿When﻿are﻿breaches﻿likely﻿to﻿take﻿place?﻿Does﻿it﻿happen﻿when﻿political﻿
tensions﻿rise﻿and﻿those﻿prone﻿to﻿engaging﻿in﻿terrorism﻿might﻿increase?﻿Does﻿it﻿happen﻿when﻿employ-
ees﻿become﻿disgruntled?﻿How﻿about﻿when﻿people﻿want﻿to﻿set﻿themselves﻿a﻿challenge﻿to﻿see﻿if﻿they﻿can﻿
violate﻿a﻿security﻿system?﻿There﻿are﻿numerous﻿questions﻿about﻿why﻿these﻿intrusions﻿may﻿happen﻿at﻿this﻿
particular﻿time﻿and﻿in﻿particular﻿places.﻿Culture,﻿decision﻿making,﻿spotting﻿vulnerabilities,﻿etc.﻿all﻿make﻿
for﻿an﻿online﻿system﻿that﻿is﻿rife﻿to﻿be﻿breached.﻿In﻿today’s﻿society,﻿we﻿cannot﻿take﻿a﻿lax﻿approach﻿to﻿our﻿
security﻿nor﻿to﻿leaving﻿human﻿behaviour﻿to﻿the﻿academics.﻿We﻿must﻿join﻿forces﻿to﻿make﻿sure﻿that﻿we﻿all﻿
stay﻿safe,﻿and﻿continue﻿to﻿understand,﻿before﻿the﻿violators﻿do,﻿what﻿cyber﻿vulnerabilities﻿we﻿have﻿exposed.
This﻿book﻿was﻿written﻿with﻿a﻿large﻿audience﻿in﻿mind.﻿First,﻿it﻿was﻿created﻿for﻿the﻿practitioner.﻿When﻿
understanding﻿your﻿own﻿organisation﻿and﻿how﻿to﻿protect﻿it,﻿we﻿thought﻿a﻿base﻿in﻿human﻿behaviour﻿would﻿
be﻿relevant.﻿If﻿human﻿behaviour﻿and﻿a﻿century﻿of﻿research﻿in﻿this﻿field﻿is﻿ignored,﻿we﻿are﻿not﻿using﻿our﻿
collective﻿knowledge﻿to﻿help﻿society﻿today.
Second,﻿this﻿book﻿is﻿addressed﻿to﻿the﻿policymaker.﻿Knowing﻿what﻿the﻿risks﻿are﻿from﻿the﻿organisational﻿
perspective﻿interwoven﻿with﻿research﻿is﻿crucial﻿when﻿considering﻿applications﻿of﻿academe.﻿Policymakers﻿
often﻿do﻿not﻿have﻿the﻿luxury﻿of﻿reading﻿the﻿latest﻿research﻿in﻿a﻿field﻿before﻿needing﻿to﻿consider﻿the﻿political﻿
agenda.﻿Hopefully﻿this﻿book﻿gives﻿a﻿summary﻿of﻿relevant﻿literature﻿when﻿contemplating﻿cyber﻿security.
Third,﻿this﻿book﻿was﻿conceived﻿for﻿the﻿academic﻿and﻿researcher.﻿These﻿chapters﻿show﻿how﻿theoretical﻿
work﻿in﻿psychology﻿can﻿be﻿applied﻿to﻿a﻿timely﻿and﻿real﻿world﻿problem.﻿As﻿much﻿as﻿researchers﻿enjoy﻿
studying﻿concepts﻿to﻿support﻿or﻿refute﻿theory,﻿to﻿do﻿so﻿and﻿see﻿it﻿have﻿great﻿impact﻿in﻿the﻿broader﻿com-
munity﻿is﻿pleasing.﻿This﻿book﻿exemplifies﻿how﻿such﻿work﻿can﻿provide﻿said﻿impact.﻿Reading﻿the﻿chapters﻿
provides﻿a﻿trail﻿map﻿of﻿concepts﻿in﻿psychology﻿being﻿applied﻿to﻿keeping﻿us﻿all﻿safe﻿in﻿the﻿cyberworld.
Finally,﻿technology﻿developers﻿should﻿read﻿this﻿book.﻿Those﻿who﻿work﻿in﻿the﻿field﻿of﻿cyber﻿security﻿
undeniably﻿see﻿the﻿thin﻿line﻿that﻿is﻿walked﻿between﻿staying﻿secure﻿and﻿keeping﻿cyber﻿systems﻿free.﻿We﻿
all﻿want﻿systems﻿that﻿allow﻿as﻿many﻿people﻿to﻿use﻿them﻿as﻿possible﻿and﻿to﻿keep﻿our﻿lives﻿as﻿simple﻿as﻿
they﻿can﻿be.﻿But,﻿creating﻿a﻿banking﻿system﻿for﻿people﻿to﻿use﻿from﻿the﻿comfort﻿of﻿their﻿home,﻿while﻿it﻿
may﻿keep﻿our﻿lives﻿simpler﻿as﻿we﻿do﻿not﻿need﻿to﻿go﻿to﻿the﻿bank﻿during﻿opening﻿hours,﻿is﻿not﻿useful﻿if﻿
our﻿finances﻿are﻿at﻿risk.﻿A﻿fine﻿balance﻿must﻿be﻿found﻿by﻿our﻿technology﻿counterparts﻿to﻿ensure﻿that﻿
social﻿groups﻿may﻿use﻿online﻿fora﻿without﻿posing﻿a﻿risk﻿for﻿terrorist﻿attacks.﻿If﻿the﻿technologists﻿can﻿
find﻿that﻿happy﻿medium,﻿we﻿are﻿in﻿as﻿safe﻿and﻿user﻿friendly﻿a﻿world﻿as﻿possible.﻿The﻿problem﻿of﻿course﻿
is﻿that﻿that﻿line﻿often﻿moves﻿and﻿the﻿technologists﻿may﻿use﻿this﻿book﻿to﻿better﻿understand﻿how﻿human﻿
behaviour﻿can﻿change﻿and﻿shift﻿over﻿time,﻿providing﻿them﻿a﻿stronger﻿foundation﻿for﻿which﻿to﻿understand﻿
where﻿that﻿line﻿is﻿moving﻿to﻿next.
Below﻿is﻿a﻿brief﻿summary﻿of﻿the﻿chapters﻿in﻿this﻿book.﻿They﻿range﻿across﻿topics﻿as﻿you﻿will﻿see﻿but﻿
hopefully﻿gives﻿a﻿flavour﻿of﻿how﻿psychology﻿can﻿contribute﻿to﻿this﻿field.﻿As﻿both﻿psychology﻿and﻿cyber﻿
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security﻿are﻿vast,﻿it﻿does﻿not﻿attempt﻿to﻿be﻿an﻿exhaustive﻿book.﻿Yet,﻿it﻿should﻿give﻿a﻿strong﻿foundation﻿on﻿
understanding﻿a﻿range﻿of﻿relevant﻿topics﻿from﻿decision﻿making,﻿cognitive﻿bias,﻿terrorism,﻿social﻿media﻿
and﻿guidance﻿on﻿how﻿to﻿do﻿one’s﻿own﻿study﻿in﻿an﻿ethically﻿appropriate﻿way.
Chapter﻿1,﻿“Online﻿Decision﻿Making:﻿Online﻿Influence﻿and﻿Implications﻿for﻿Cyber﻿Security,”﻿addresses﻿
the﻿challenges﻿of﻿understanding﻿the﻿differences﻿between﻿decision﻿making﻿that﻿is﻿performed﻿online﻿and﻿
research﻿that﻿uses﻿an﻿online﻿forum﻿alone.﻿This﻿chapter﻿looks﻿at﻿how﻿computer﻿mediated﻿communication﻿
impacts﻿on﻿how﻿we﻿make﻿decisions﻿online.﻿Developing﻿perspectives﻿on﻿decision﻿making,﻿and﻿the﻿ap-
plicability﻿of﻿the﻿theories﻿to﻿the﻿online﻿environment﻿is﻿considered,﻿with﻿issues﻿such﻿as﻿buying﻿behaviour﻿
to﻿radicalisation﻿being﻿addressed.﻿This﻿chapter﻿encourages﻿joint﻿thinking﻿from﻿the﻿practitioner﻿and﻿the﻿
researcher.﻿It﻿offers﻿the﻿idea﻿that﻿multiple﻿models﻿and﻿perspectives﻿are﻿needed﻿to﻿understand﻿how﻿CMC﻿
influences﻿our﻿capacity﻿to﻿make﻿decisions﻿in﻿the﻿online﻿forums.
Chapter﻿2,﻿“Human﻿Factors﻿Leading﻿to﻿Online﻿Fraud﻿Victimisation:﻿Literature﻿Review﻿and﻿Explor-
ing﻿the﻿Role﻿of﻿Personality﻿Traits,”﻿highlights﻿the﻿role﻿human﻿behaviour﻿has﻿as﻿the﻿weakest﻿link﻿in﻿cyber﻿
security.﻿This﻿literature﻿review﻿explores﻿the﻿role﻿of﻿personality﻿traits,﻿seeks﻿an﻿explanation﻿for﻿online﻿
fraud﻿victimisation,﻿and﻿does﻿so﻿from﻿a﻿criminological﻿and﻿psychological﻿perspective.﻿First,﻿a﻿review﻿
of﻿the﻿literature﻿in﻿this﻿area﻿is﻿presented.﻿More﻿specifically,﻿the﻿routine﻿activity﻿approach﻿and﻿the﻿Big﻿
Five﻿personality﻿traits﻿are﻿discussed﻿and﻿applied﻿to﻿online﻿fraud.﻿Second,﻿a﻿novel﻿empirical﻿study﻿on﻿
personality﻿traits﻿is﻿presented,﻿in﻿which﻿the﻿influence﻿of﻿the﻿Big﻿Five﻿personality﻿traits﻿on﻿online﻿fraud﻿
victimisation﻿is﻿assessed.﻿This﻿chapter﻿ends﻿by﻿presenting﻿implications﻿for﻿online﻿fraud﻿prevention﻿as﻿
well﻿as﻿possibilities﻿to﻿advance﻿the﻿study﻿of﻿cyber﻿victimisation.
Chapter﻿3,﻿“The﻿‘Human﻿Factor’﻿in﻿Cyber﻿Security:﻿Exploring﻿the﻿Accidental﻿Insider,”﻿describes﻿the﻿
threat﻿posed﻿by﻿members﻿of﻿an﻿organisation.﻿These﻿threats﻿may﻿come﻿from﻿disgruntled﻿employees﻿or﻿more﻿
innocuously﻿from﻿ignorance.﻿Either﻿way,﻿they﻿pose﻿a﻿potentially﻿serious﻿threat﻿to﻿information﻿security.﻿
This﻿chapter﻿discussing﻿aspects﻿of﻿the﻿insider﻿threat﻿as﻿well﻿as﻿the﻿human﻿factors﻿that﻿may﻿contribute﻿to﻿
one﻿becoming﻿a﻿threat.﻿Methods﻿to﻿detect﻿and﻿mitigate﻿the﻿threats﻿are﻿presented﻿here.
Chapter﻿4,﻿“Cyber﻿+﻿Culture:﻿Exploring﻿the﻿Relationship,”﻿highlights﻿some﻿of﻿the﻿findings﻿of﻿a﻿selec-
tion﻿of﻿recent﻿studies﻿on﻿the﻿relationship﻿between﻿national﻿culture﻿and﻿specific﻿cyber﻿behaviours.﻿The﻿
goal﻿of﻿this﻿work﻿was﻿to﻿understand﻿the﻿ongoing﻿problem﻿of﻿attribution﻿in﻿cyber﻿security﻿as﻿advances﻿
in﻿technology﻿is﻿showing﻿improvement﻿in﻿cyber-attack﻿attribution,﻿albeit﻿slowly.﻿Interest﻿in﻿the﻿psycho-
logical﻿research﻿of﻿decision﻿making﻿and﻿the﻿role﻿of﻿the﻿human﻿in﻿perception﻿management﻿lead﻿to﻿the﻿
belief﻿that﻿behaviour﻿may﻿be﻿able﻿to﻿ward﻿off﻿some﻿cyber-attacks﻿by﻿defending﻿and﻿training﻿users.﻿In﻿
modelling﻿behaviours﻿related﻿to﻿cyber﻿security,﻿one﻿needs﻿to﻿consider﻿the﻿role﻿of﻿culture﻿in﻿values﻿which﻿
shape﻿behaviours.﻿This﻿chapter﻿crucially﻿contributes﻿to﻿an﻿area﻿of﻿research﻿that﻿is﻿lacking﻿by﻿providing﻿
foundational﻿work﻿in﻿this﻿field.
Chapter﻿5,﻿“Examinations﻿of﻿Email﻿Fraud﻿Susceptibility:﻿Perspectives﻿From﻿Academic﻿Research﻿and﻿
Industry﻿Practice,”﻿covers﻿issues﻿associated﻿with﻿the﻿positive﻿and﻿negative﻿sides﻿of﻿the﻿internet﻿being﻿
used﻿for﻿entertainment,﻿commerce﻿and﻿communication.﻿The﻿potential﻿for﻿human﻿advancement﻿in﻿this﻿
venue﻿is﻿substantial﻿but﻿so﻿is﻿the﻿risk﻿of﻿increasingly﻿sophisticated﻿cyber-attacks.﻿These﻿undoubtedly﻿
could﻿have﻿serious﻿personal﻿and﻿commercial﻿implications.﻿From﻿a﻿psychological﻿viewpoint﻿the﻿attacks﻿
offer﻿an﻿insight﻿into﻿the﻿decision﻿making﻿processes﻿which﻿may﻿lead﻿to﻿being﻿a﻿victim﻿of﻿online﻿fraud.﻿
The﻿authors﻿use﻿their﻿chapter﻿to﻿attempt﻿to﻿understand﻿responses﻿to﻿phishing﻿emails﻿whilst﻿exploring﻿
how﻿industry﻿and﻿academic﻿research﻿might﻿collaborate﻿to﻿better﻿address﻿email﻿fraud﻿threats.﻿Various﻿
methods﻿to﻿understand﻿susceptibility﻿and﻿considering﻿preventable﻿security﻿measures﻿are﻿used﻿to﻿try﻿to﻿
develop﻿integrative﻿solutions.
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Chapter﻿6,﻿“Introducing﻿Psychological﻿Concepts﻿and﻿Methods﻿to﻿Cyber﻿Security﻿Students,”﻿discusses﻿
the﻿role﻿and﻿ impact﻿of﻿psychology﻿research﻿on﻿cyber﻿security﻿education.﻿By﻿using﻿both﻿prior﻿cross-
disciplinary﻿teaching﻿experience﻿and﻿observations﻿of﻿teaching﻿psychological﻿principles﻿and﻿methods﻿to﻿
undergraduate﻿and﻿postgraduate﻿cyber﻿security﻿students,﻿the﻿authors﻿have﻿compiled﻿information﻿about﻿
their﻿experiences.﻿There﻿is﻿a﻿strong﻿focus﻿on﻿making﻿the﻿material﻿accessible﻿and﻿engaging.﻿Suggestions﻿
as﻿to﻿how﻿to﻿integrate﻿psychological﻿into﻿the﻿cyber﻿security﻿curriculum﻿completes﻿the﻿chapter.
Chapter﻿7,﻿“The﻿Role﻿of﻿Psychology﻿in﻿Understanding﻿Online﻿Trust,”﻿addresses﻿the﻿challenges﻿of﻿trust-
ing﻿people﻿in﻿the﻿online﻿environment.﻿The﻿authors﻿discuss﻿the﻿manipulation﻿of﻿trust﻿and﻿the﻿sometimes﻿
dire﻿economic﻿and﻿psychological﻿consequences.﻿Literature﻿on﻿developing﻿trust﻿online﻿is﻿reviewed﻿and﻿
several﻿case﻿studies﻿describe﻿trust﻿relationships.﻿Crowdfunding,﻿online﻿health﻿forums﻿and﻿online﻿dating﻿
help﻿us﻿to﻿understand﻿the﻿need﻿for﻿stronger﻿security﻿measures﻿which﻿can﻿increase﻿trust﻿judgments﻿and﻿
minimise﻿the﻿risk﻿of﻿falling﻿prey﻿to﻿fraud﻿online.
Chapter﻿ 8,﻿ “Volunteered﻿ Surveillance,”﻿ addresses﻿ the﻿ issues﻿ of﻿ data﻿ collection,﻿ data﻿ ownership,﻿
digital﻿tracking,﻿digital﻿privacy,﻿cyber﻿security﻿and﻿ad-blocking﻿in﻿modern﻿society﻿through﻿managerial,﻿
psychological﻿and﻿behavioural﻿lenses.﻿As﻿technology﻿advances﻿more﻿parties﻿gain﻿access﻿to﻿private﻿data﻿
relying﻿on﻿“agree﻿or﻿leave”﻿contracts,﻿forcing﻿individuals﻿to﻿give﻿up﻿ownership﻿of﻿their﻿own﻿behavioural﻿
patterns.﻿These﻿data﻿are﻿then﻿commonly﻿used﻿for﻿commercial﻿purposes﻿in﻿forms﻿of﻿advertising,﻿targeted﻿
marketing﻿or﻿more.﻿Consumers﻿on﻿the﻿other﻿hand,﻿seem﻿to﻿react﻿to﻿this﻿in﻿a﻿very﻿broad﻿spectrum﻿rang-
ing﻿from﻿ad-blocking﻿software﻿to﻿voluntary﻿data﻿submission.﻿This﻿chapter﻿analyses﻿why﻿and﻿how﻿these﻿
reactions﻿happen﻿and﻿propose﻿solutions﻿that﻿could﻿be﻿beneficial﻿to﻿all﻿parties﻿included.﻿This﻿is﻿a﻿very﻿
novel﻿macro﻿concern﻿and﻿requires﻿institutionalised﻿oversight﻿of﻿all﻿concerned﻿stakeholders;﻿governments,﻿
digital﻿service﻿providers﻿and﻿publishers,﻿advertisers,﻿self-regulatory﻿organisations﻿in﻿related﻿sectors﻿and﻿
non-governmental﻿organisations﻿protecting﻿consumers.
Chapter﻿9,﻿“Psychological﻿and﻿Behavioral﻿Examinations﻿of﻿Online﻿Terrorism,”﻿presents﻿mixed﻿method﻿
research﻿results﻿on﻿how﻿terrorists﻿use﻿the﻿internet﻿to﻿further﻿their﻿agendas.﻿Several﻿studies﻿have﻿investi-
gated﻿how﻿terrorists﻿use﻿the﻿online﻿environment﻿and﻿the﻿chapter﻿first﻿explores﻿current﻿knowledge﻿about﻿
the﻿online﻿behaviour﻿of﻿terrorists.﻿It﻿follows﻿on﻿to﻿describe﻿how﻿qualitative﻿and﻿quantitative﻿combined﻿
studies﻿can﻿be﻿used﻿to﻿consider﻿how﻿to﻿conduct﻿research﻿in﻿this﻿area.﻿After﻿that﻿a﻿serious﻿discussion﻿is﻿
given﻿to﻿the﻿difficult﻿area﻿of﻿ethics﻿in﻿this﻿field﻿of﻿research.﻿The﻿chapter﻿closes﻿by﻿imparting﻿information﻿
to﻿the﻿reader﻿about﻿the﻿skills﻿and﻿knowledge﻿necessary﻿to﻿undertake﻿one’s﻿own﻿research﻿in﻿this﻿arena﻿
along﻿with﻿consideration﻿of﻿the﻿ethics﻿around﻿such﻿work.
Chapter﻿10,﻿“The﻿Role﻿of﻿Religiosity﻿in﻿Technology﻿Acceptance:﻿The﻿Case﻿of﻿Privacy﻿in﻿Saudi﻿Ara-
bia,”﻿covers﻿issues﻿associated﻿with﻿how﻿religion﻿affects﻿user﻿behaviour﻿and﻿the﻿acceptance﻿of﻿emerging﻿
technology.﻿Religiosity﻿is﻿used﻿to﻿measure﻿individual﻿beliefs;﻿this﻿chapter﻿explains﻿how﻿Islam﻿influences﻿
user﻿behaviour﻿and﻿intention﻿to﻿use﻿technology.﻿Saudi﻿Arabia,﻿as﻿an﻿example﻿of﻿a﻿hardline﻿Islamic﻿nation﻿
according﻿to﻿the﻿author﻿of﻿this﻿chapter,﻿is﻿used﻿for﻿the﻿discussions﻿of﻿privacy﻿and﻿technology﻿influence﻿
in﻿a﻿single﻿religion﻿country.﻿The﻿chapter﻿presents﻿conclusions﻿on﻿how﻿religion﻿influences﻿people’s﻿be-
haviour,﻿privacy﻿perceptions﻿and﻿acceptance﻿technology.
Chapter﻿11,﻿“Groups﻿Online:﻿Hacktivism﻿and﻿Social﻿Protest,”﻿reviews﻿the﻿broadly﻿defined﻿topic﻿of﻿
hacktivism.﻿It﻿offers﻿up﻿the﻿proviso﻿that﻿it﻿can﻿be﻿viewed﻿as﻿a﻿legitimate﻿form﻿of﻿online﻿protest﻿or﻿one﻿of﻿
illegal﻿hacking.﻿Additionally,﻿there﻿are﻿those﻿who﻿feel﻿that﻿there﻿is﻿truth﻿to﻿both﻿arguments,﻿and﻿believe﻿
it﻿is﻿imperative﻿to﻿protect﻿those﻿who﻿engage﻿in﻿hacktivism.﻿These﻿counter﻿definitions﻿make﻿it﻿difficult﻿
to﻿understand﻿how﻿to﻿bridge﻿the﻿gap﻿in﻿assessing﻿motivations.﻿The﻿authors﻿give﻿a﻿brief﻿introduction﻿to﻿
hacktivism﻿and﻿online﻿social﻿protest﻿online.﻿In﻿particular,﻿the﻿socio-psychological﻿and﻿cognitive﻿factors﻿
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possibly﻿providing﻿the﻿foundation﻿for﻿individuals﻿to﻿take﻿part﻿in﻿hacktivism﻿groups﻿are﻿addressed.﻿Within﻿
the﻿socio-psychological﻿arena,﻿the﻿authors﻿consider﻿the﻿concepts﻿of﻿social﻿ties﻿and﻿influence.﻿These﻿are﻿
subfields﻿that﻿are﻿important﻿to﻿address﻿when﻿looking﻿at﻿how﻿individuals﻿join,﻿form﻿and﻿remain﻿in﻿groups.﻿
The﻿subfield﻿of﻿cognitive﻿biases﻿is﻿important﻿as﻿well﻿and﻿biases﻿are﻿examined﻿in﻿light﻿of﻿how﻿people﻿
think﻿and﻿process﻿information﻿given﻿the﻿biases﻿we﻿each﻿hold.﻿Conclusions﻿are﻿drawn﻿with﻿strategies﻿to﻿
mitigate﻿and﻿support﻿vulnerabilities﻿considering﻿hacktivism﻿and﻿social﻿protest.
Chapter﻿12,﻿“A﻿Cyber-Psychological﻿and﻿Behavioral﻿Approach﻿to﻿Online﻿Radicalization,”﻿addresses﻿
the﻿challenges﻿of﻿bringing﻿mainstream﻿theories﻿of﻿radicalisation﻿and﻿cyberpsychology﻿together﻿with﻿a﻿
goal﻿towards﻿understanding﻿who﻿might﻿become﻿radicalised.﻿The﻿chapter﻿uses﻿Islamic﻿State﻿of﻿Iraq﻿and﻿
al-Sham﻿(ISIS)﻿as﻿a﻿case﻿study﻿to﻿understand﻿how﻿radicalised﻿groups﻿use﻿cyberspace.﻿By﻿using﻿academic﻿
theory,﻿the﻿chapter﻿considers﻿behavioural﻿aspects﻿of﻿the﻿radicalisation﻿process.﻿It﻿also﻿reviews﻿how﻿those﻿
theories﻿are﻿relevant﻿in﻿explaining,﻿facilitating﻿and﻿attracting﻿people﻿online﻿to﻿a﻿radicalisation﻿pathway.﻿
Chapter﻿13,﻿“Insider﻿Attack﻿Analysis﻿ in﻿Building﻿Effective﻿Cyber﻿Security﻿ for﻿an﻿Organization,”﻿
provides﻿a﻿detailed﻿study﻿on﻿how﻿behaviours﻿from﻿those﻿inside﻿may﻿hinder﻿security﻿of﻿the﻿organisation.﻿
A﻿number﻿of﻿recent﻿studies﻿had﻿shown﻿that﻿even﻿though﻿there﻿are﻿highly﻿advanced﻿and﻿secure﻿technical﻿
controls,﻿several﻿cyber-attacks﻿were﻿carried﻿out﻿across﻿multiple﻿organisations﻿yielding﻿the﻿release﻿of﻿
confidential﻿information.﻿It﻿should﻿be﻿clear﻿then﻿that﻿technical﻿advancements﻿of﻿cyber﻿defences﻿are﻿not﻿
impenetrable﻿to﻿organisational﻿security.﻿Insiders﻿often﻿have﻿the﻿advantage﻿of﻿being﻿a﻿trusted﻿party﻿when﻿
engaging﻿in﻿cyber-attacks﻿and﻿monitoring﻿said﻿insiders﻿is﻿very﻿challenging.﻿The﻿insider﻿has﻿the﻿potential﻿
to﻿cause﻿problems﻿to﻿the﻿social﻿credibility﻿of﻿the﻿organisation﻿as﻿well﻿as﻿damage﻿its﻿financial﻿stability.﻿
The﻿author﻿reviews﻿behaviours﻿of﻿insiders﻿who﻿may﻿pose﻿a﻿cyber﻿security﻿threat﻿to﻿an﻿organisation﻿and﻿
provides﻿some﻿guidance﻿for﻿reliable﻿security﻿frameworks.
Chapter﻿14,﻿“A﻿Study﻿of﻿Good-Enough﻿Security﻿in﻿the﻿Context﻿of﻿Rural﻿Business﻿Process﻿Outsourc-
ing,”﻿presents﻿insights﻿using﻿scenarios﻿of﻿object﻿decomposition﻿and﻿sharing.﻿By﻿looking﻿at﻿low﻿value﻿data﻿
objects﻿such﻿as﻿insurance﻿or﻿data-entry﻿forms﻿the﻿chapter﻿is﻿able﻿to﻿explore﻿how﻿information﻿is﻿shared﻿
between﻿a﻿client﻿and﻿Rural﻿Business﻿Process﻿Outsourcing﻿(RBPO)﻿organisations.﻿Such﻿sharing﻿is﻿usu-
ally﻿across﻿tasks﻿like﻿translation,﻿proof-reading﻿and﻿data﻿entry.﻿These﻿data﻿objects﻿are﻿decomposed﻿into﻿
smaller﻿parts﻿before﻿being﻿sent﻿to﻿the﻿RBPO﻿allowing﻿for﻿each﻿RBPO﻿user﻿to﻿only﻿access﻿a﻿few﻿parts﻿
of﻿a﻿complete﻿data﻿object.﻿Nevertheless,﻿this﻿information﻿could﻿be﻿leaked﻿to﻿unauthorised﻿users﻿which﻿
would﻿breach﻿the﻿data﻿security.﻿As﻿the﻿value﻿of﻿these﻿parts﻿is﻿low﻿there﻿is﻿little﻿incentive﻿for﻿them﻿to﻿
truly﻿be﻿leaked.﻿Here﻿is﻿where﻿the﻿idea﻿of﻿a﻿good﻿enough﻿security﻿system﻿comes﻿in.﻿The﻿good﻿enough﻿
model﻿should﻿provide﻿reasonable﻿security﻿to﻿a﻿group﻿of﻿low﻿value﻿data﻿objects.﻿This﻿chapter﻿describes﻿
the﻿work﻿of﻿secure﻿data﻿assignment﻿and﻿leakage﻿in﻿RBPO.﻿By﻿modelling﻿this﻿work﻿as﻿an﻿optimisation﻿
problem,﻿the﻿authors﻿are﻿able﻿to﻿review﻿object﻿decomposition﻿scenarios﻿in﻿light﻿of﻿sharing,﻿penalty﻿as-
signment﻿and﻿data﻿leakage.
Chapter﻿15,﻿“Online﻿Research﻿Methods,”﻿opens﻿ the﻿discussion﻿on﻿the﻿use﻿of﻿more﻿contemporary﻿
approaches﻿to﻿data﻿collection﻿than﻿traditional﻿pen﻿and﻿paper﻿questionnaires.﻿Although﻿the﻿traditional﻿
methods﻿are﻿still﻿more﻿readily﻿used,﻿various﻿online﻿methodologies﻿may﻿enhance﻿scientific﻿investigation﻿
and﻿understandings﻿of﻿particular﻿phenomena.﻿The﻿chapter﻿explores﻿how﻿these﻿could﻿be﻿potentially﻿useful﻿
in﻿understanding﻿psychological﻿issues﻿related﻿to﻿a﻿range﻿of﻿cyber﻿security﻿problems.
Chapter﻿ 16,﻿ “Emerging﻿Threats﻿ for﻿ the﻿Human﻿Element﻿ and﻿Countermeasures﻿ in﻿Current﻿Cyber﻿
Security﻿Landscape,”﻿presents﻿an﻿overview﻿of﻿emerging﻿issues﻿in﻿psychology﻿of﻿human﻿behaviour﻿and﻿
the﻿evolving﻿nature﻿of﻿cyber﻿threats.﻿The﻿chapter﻿reflects﻿on﻿the﻿role﻿of﻿social﻿engineering﻿as﻿the﻿entry﻿
point﻿of﻿many﻿sophisticated﻿attacks﻿and﻿highlights﻿the﻿relevance﻿of﻿the﻿human﻿element﻿as﻿the﻿starting﻿
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point﻿of﻿implementing﻿cyber﻿security﻿programmes﻿in﻿organisations﻿as﻿well﻿as﻿securing﻿individual﻿online﻿
behaviour.﻿Issues﻿associated﻿with﻿the﻿emerging﻿trends﻿in﻿human﻿behaviour﻿research﻿and﻿ethics﻿are﻿pre-
sented﻿for﻿further﻿discussion.﻿The﻿chapter﻿concludes﻿with﻿a﻿set﻿of﻿open﻿research﻿questions﻿warranting﻿
immediate﻿academic﻿attention﻿to﻿avoid﻿the﻿exponential﻿growth﻿of﻿information﻿breaches﻿in﻿the﻿future.
This﻿publication﻿addresses﻿ the﻿emerging﻿ importance﻿of﻿digital﻿psychology﻿and﻿ the﻿opportunities﻿
offered﻿by﻿cyber﻿ researchers.﻿We﻿hope﻿ that﻿experts﻿ from﻿all﻿areas﻿of﻿ research,﻿ information﻿systems,﻿
psychology,﻿sociology,﻿human﻿resources,﻿leadership,﻿strategy,﻿innovation,﻿law,﻿finance﻿and﻿others,﻿will﻿
find﻿this﻿book﻿useful﻿in﻿their﻿practice.
John McAlaney
Bournemouth University, UK
Vladlena Benson
University of West London, UK
Lara A. Frumkin
Open University, UK
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With﻿ the﻿advent﻿of﻿ the﻿ internet,﻿criminals﻿gained﻿new﻿tools﻿ to﻿commit﻿crimes.﻿Crimes﻿ in﻿which﻿ the﻿
use﻿of﻿connected﻿information﻿technologies﻿is﻿essential﻿for﻿the﻿realisation﻿of﻿the﻿offence﻿are﻿defined﻿as﻿
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their﻿“attack,”﻿but﻿their﻿actions﻿can﻿be﻿equally﻿as﻿damaging﻿and﻿disruptive﻿to﻿the﻿organisation.﻿This﻿chapter﻿
presents﻿an﻿exploration﻿of﻿fundamental﻿human﻿factors﻿that﻿could﻿contribute﻿to﻿an﻿individual﻿becoming﻿
an﻿unintentional﻿threat.﻿Furthermore,﻿key﻿frameworks﻿for﻿designing﻿mitigations﻿for﻿such﻿threats﻿are﻿also﻿
presented,﻿alongside﻿suggestions﻿for﻿future﻿research﻿in﻿this﻿area.
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Technical﻿advances﻿in﻿cyber-attack﻿attribution﻿continues﻿to﻿show﻿incremental﻿improvement.﻿A﻿growing﻿
interest﻿in﻿the﻿role﻿of﻿the﻿human﻿in﻿perception﻿management,﻿and﻿decision-making﻿suggest﻿that﻿other﻿
aspects﻿of﻿human﻿cognition﻿may﻿be﻿able﻿to﻿help﻿inform﻿attribution,﻿and﻿other﻿aspects﻿of﻿cyber﻿security﻿
such﻿as﻿defending﻿and﻿training.﻿Values﻿shape﻿behaviors﻿and﻿cultural﻿values﻿set﻿norms﻿for﻿groups﻿of﻿people.﻿
Therefore,﻿they﻿should﻿be﻿considered﻿when﻿modeling﻿behaviors.﻿The﻿lack﻿of﻿studies﻿in﻿this﻿area﻿requires﻿
exploration﻿and﻿foundational﻿work﻿to﻿learn﻿the﻿limits﻿of﻿this﻿area﻿of﻿research.﻿This﻿chapter﻿highlights﻿
some﻿of﻿the﻿findings﻿of﻿some﻿of﻿the﻿recent﻿studies.
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The﻿ internet﻿ provides﻿ an﻿ ever-expanding,﻿ valuable﻿ resource﻿ for﻿ entertainment,﻿ communication,﻿ and﻿
commerce.﻿ However,﻿ this﻿ comes﻿ with﻿ the﻿ simultaneous﻿ advancement﻿ and﻿ sophistication﻿ of﻿ cyber-
attacks,﻿which﻿have﻿serious﻿implications﻿on﻿both﻿a﻿personal﻿and﻿commercial﻿level,﻿as﻿well﻿as﻿within﻿the﻿
criminal﻿justice﻿system.﻿Psychologically,﻿such﻿attacks﻿offer﻿an﻿intriguing,﻿under-exploited﻿arena﻿for﻿the﻿
understanding﻿of﻿the﻿decision-making﻿processes﻿leading﻿to﻿online﻿fraud﻿victimisation.﻿In﻿this﻿chapter,﻿
the﻿authors﻿focus﻿on﻿approaches﻿taken﻿to﻿understand﻿response﻿behaviour﻿surrounding﻿phishing﻿emails.﻿
The﻿chapter﻿outlines﻿how﻿approaches﻿from﻿industry﻿and﻿academic﻿research﻿might﻿work﻿together﻿to﻿more﻿
﻿effectively﻿understand﻿and﻿potentially﻿tackle﻿the﻿persistent﻿threat﻿of﻿email﻿fraud.﻿In﻿doing﻿this,﻿the﻿authors﻿
address﻿alternative﻿methodological﻿approaches﻿taken﻿to﻿understand﻿susceptibility,﻿key﻿insights﻿drawn﻿
from﻿each,﻿how﻿useful﻿these﻿are﻿in﻿working﻿towards﻿preventative﻿security﻿measures,﻿and﻿the﻿usability﻿of﻿
each﻿approach.﻿It﻿is﻿hoped﻿that﻿these﻿can﻿contribute﻿to﻿collaborative﻿solutions.
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This﻿chapter﻿begins﻿with﻿a﻿brief﻿review﻿of﻿the﻿literature﻿that﻿highlights﻿what﻿psychology﻿research﻿and﻿
practice﻿can﻿offer﻿to﻿cybersecurity﻿education.﻿The﻿authors﻿draw﻿on﻿their﻿wide-ranging﻿inter-disciplinary﻿
teaching﻿experience,﻿and﻿in﻿this﻿chapter,﻿they﻿discuss﻿their﻿observations﻿gained﻿from﻿teaching﻿psychological﻿
principles﻿ and﻿methods﻿ to﻿ undergraduate﻿ and﻿ postgraduate﻿ cybersecurity﻿ students.﻿The﻿ authors﻿ pay﻿
special﻿attention﻿to﻿the﻿consideration﻿of﻿the﻿characteristics﻿of﻿cybersecurity﻿students﻿so﻿that﻿psychology﻿
is﻿taught﻿in﻿a﻿way﻿that﻿is﻿accessible﻿and﻿engaging.﻿Finally,﻿the﻿authors﻿offer﻿some﻿practical﻿suggestions﻿
for﻿academics﻿to﻿help﻿them﻿incorporate﻿psychology﻿into﻿the﻿cybersecurity﻿curriculum.
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Across﻿many﻿online﻿contexts,﻿internet﻿users﻿are﻿required﻿to﻿make﻿judgments﻿of﻿trustworthiness﻿in﻿the﻿
systems﻿or﻿other﻿users﻿that﻿they﻿are﻿connecting﻿with.﻿But﻿how﻿can﻿a﻿user﻿know﻿that﻿the﻿interactions﻿they﻿
engage﻿in﻿are﻿ legitimate?﻿In﻿cases﻿where﻿ trust﻿ is﻿manipulated,﻿ there﻿can﻿be﻿severe﻿consequences﻿for﻿
the﻿user﻿both﻿economically﻿and﻿psychologically.﻿In﻿this﻿chapter,﻿the﻿authors﻿outline﻿key﻿psychological﻿
literature﻿to﻿date﻿that﻿has﻿addressed﻿the﻿question﻿of﻿how﻿trust﻿develops﻿in﻿online﻿environments.﻿Specifically,﻿
three﻿use﻿cases﻿in﻿which﻿trust﻿relationships﻿emerge﻿are﻿discussed:﻿crowdfunding,﻿online﻿health﻿forums,﻿
and﻿online﻿dating.﻿By﻿including﻿examples﻿of﻿different﻿types﻿of﻿online﻿interaction,﻿the﻿authors﻿aim﻿to﻿
demonstrate﻿the﻿need﻿for﻿advanced﻿security﻿measures﻿that﻿ensure﻿valid﻿trust﻿judgments﻿and﻿minimise﻿
the﻿risk﻿of﻿fraud﻿victimisation.
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As﻿the﻿front﻿end﻿of﻿the﻿digitized﻿commercial﻿world,﻿corporations,﻿marketers,﻿and﻿advertisers﻿are﻿under﻿
the﻿spotlight﻿for﻿taking﻿advantage﻿of﻿some﻿part﻿of﻿the﻿big﻿data﻿provided﻿by﻿consumers﻿via﻿their﻿digital﻿
presence﻿and﻿digital﻿advertising.﻿Now,﻿collectors﻿and﻿users﻿of﻿that﻿data﻿have﻿escalated﻿the﻿level﻿of﻿their﻿
asymmetric﻿power﻿with﻿scope﻿and﻿depth﻿of﻿the﻿instant﻿and﻿historical﻿data﻿on﻿consumers.﻿Since﻿consumers﻿
﻿have﻿lost﻿the﻿ownership﻿(control)﻿over﻿their﻿own﻿data,﻿their﻿reaction﻿ranges﻿from﻿complete﻿opposition﻿
to﻿voluntary﻿submission.﻿This﻿chapter﻿investigates﻿psychological﻿and﻿societal﻿reasons﻿for﻿this﻿variety﻿in﻿
consumer﻿behavior﻿and﻿proposes﻿that﻿a﻿contractual﻿solution﻿could﻿promote﻿a﻿beneficial﻿end﻿to﻿all﻿parties﻿
through﻿transparency﻿and﻿mutual﻿power.
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It﻿has﻿long﻿been﻿recognised﻿that﻿terrorists﻿make﻿use﻿of﻿the﻿internet﻿as﻿one﻿of﻿many﻿means﻿through﻿which﻿
to﻿further﻿their﻿cause.﻿This﻿use﻿of﻿the﻿internet﻿has﻿fuelled﻿a﻿large﻿number﻿of﻿studies﻿seeking﻿to﻿understand﻿
terrorists’﻿use﻿of﻿online﻿environments.﻿This﻿chapter﻿provides﻿an﻿overview﻿of﻿current﻿understandings﻿of﻿
online﻿ terrorist﻿behavior,﻿coupled﻿with﻿an﻿outline﻿of﻿ the﻿qualitative﻿and﻿quantitative﻿approaches﻿ that﻿
can﻿and﻿have﻿been﻿adopted﻿to﻿research﻿this﻿phenomenon.﻿The﻿chapter﻿closes﻿with﻿a﻿discussion﻿of﻿the﻿
contentious﻿issue﻿of﻿ethics﻿in﻿online﻿terrorism﻿research.﻿The﻿aim﻿of﻿the﻿chapter﻿is﻿to﻿equip﻿readers﻿with﻿
the﻿necessary﻿knowledge﻿and﻿skills﻿to﻿conduct﻿their﻿own﻿research﻿into﻿terrorists’﻿online﻿behavior,﻿taking﻿
best﻿ethical﻿practices﻿into﻿consideration﻿when﻿doing﻿so.
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Religion﻿plays﻿a﻿major﻿role﻿in﻿shaping﻿individual﻿behaviour,﻿especially﻿in﻿the﻿religious﻿countries.﻿This﻿
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ABSTRACT
This chapter provides a brief introduction to hacktivism and social protest online and highlights some 
of the socio-psychological and cognitive factors that can lead to individuals taking part in hacktivism 
groups. Hacktivism is an ill-defined area which some claim as a legitimate form of protest in the online 
world and others regard as illegal hacking; there is truth to both arguments, and those who believe it 
should be protected will continue to work for it to be recognised. The chapter explains how the depth of 
social ties and influence are still being examined, and whilst cognitive biases are recognised, strategies 
to mitigate and combat the vulnerability they present are still being developed.
INTRODUCTION
The internet is a significant aspect of global social change, and has greatly altered the nature of collective 
action and social movements (Jensen, 2015, Postmes & Brunsting, 2002). Hacktivism, a term combin-
ing ‘hacking’ and ‘activism’, is the use of various computer hacking tactics for political, social, and 
ideological motivations; hacktivists use nonviolent but often illegal digital tools to achieve these goals 
(Hampson, 2012, Krapp, 2005, Solomon, 2017). The common methods of hacktivism include defacing 
websites, using DDoS attacks, and other types of internet disruption (see Table 2, Hanna et al, 2016). 
The use of these tactics has led to challenges in distinguishing between hacktivism and hacking, as it can 
be that only the individuals’ motivation is different. This chapter will discuss the current understanding 
and context surrounding hacktivism, before examining the cognitive and social psychological factors 
that can influence those involved in hacktivism and online social protest.
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BACKGROUND
It is important to remember that cybersecurity incidents occur within a social context; even if it is not 
face to face, online interactions fulfil and rely on the same social or task needs as offline interaction 
with others (McKenna & Green, 2002). There remains, however, a lack of insight into the influence of 
psychological factors and social norms online, especially in the case of hacktivism. All actors within 
cybersecurity incidents interact with each other and within each group. Whilst hacktivism is regarded as 
a contested area, stuck between definitions of justified civil action and illegal hacking, there remains a 
strong need to challenge the stereotypes around it. The conflation of the terms “hacker” and “hacktivist”, 
with “cybercriminal” and “cyberterrorist” adds to the confusion surrounding the different typologies 
identified (see Table 1). A divisive and complex issue, there are many governments and businesses see 
hacktivism as a threat, akin to cyber-terrorism and cybercrime (Drucker & Gumpert, 2000, Kubitschko, 
2015, Manion & Goodrum, 2000, Shaw, 2006); others argue that social protest and change have always 
been a part of society (Scheuerman, 2016, Schrock, 2016), and that hacktivism is the progression of 
social protest (Kubitschko, 2015, Postill, 2014, Solomon, 2017).
Hacktivism is not a 21st century addition to the internet. The origins lie in computer based activism 
as early as the mid-1980s (Wray, 1998). One of the first known instances of a DDoS attack occurred in 
1995, when a group of Italian artists blocked websites of the French government, in protest of the decision 
to undertake a series of nuclear tests (Milan & Atton, 2015). Hacktivism was not, however, a well-known 
phenomenon until the mid to late 2000s. One of the more predominant groups, Anonymous, began to use 
media attention as part of their strategy; previously activist groups had preferred to remain undetected 
in order to protect their projects from law enforcement (Milan & Atton, 2015). As such Anonymous is 
probably the most widely known hacktivist group by the general population.
Since the mid-1990s the continued rise of hacktivism has surprised and worried many; but its’ growth 
in popularity can be attributed to several reasons. The ease of contributing from one’s home or place 
of choice means that distance is no longer an issue in supporting a cause, even if it is quite literally the 
other side of the world. Hacktivism also comes with a lower level of risk when compared to physical 
public demonstrations, whilst still allowing their messages and protests to be seen by the public across 
the internet – although this is not to say that it is risk free as some once perceived it to be (see cognitive 
Table 1. Key terms
(Computer) Hacker One with the ability to access a computer or system without admission (Raymond, 1996).
Hacktivism A method to express dissatisfaction with elements of political and social reality using online resources (Milan & Atton, 2015).
                Slacktivism Critical term for low-profile online activism, such as signing petitions and using online badges (Hanna et al, 2016).
               Whistle-blowing The leaking of confidential information to the public as a form of raising awareness about a contentious issue (Hanna et al, 2016).
Cybercriminal A criminal who uses a computer or network to commit the crime (Anderson et al, 2013, Halder & Jaishankar, 2011, Moore, 2005, NCA, 2016).
Cyberterrorist One who uses computer/network technology to terrorise opponents to further political or social objectives (Rogers, 2003).
Cyber delinquent One who engages in illegal behaviours, such as verbal violence, hacking, and illegal copying of software in online environments (Hong & Kim, 2011).
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factors). For many hacktivists now, there is also the motivation that state actors and law enforcement 
agencies have chosen to use electronic surveillance and hacking. As such the hacktivists regard their 
actions as a “means of levelling the playing field” (Solomon, 2017:3).
As a community, hacktivism is itself a social identity group, an “imagined community” (Anderson, 
1983, Jordan & Taylor, 1998); a socially constructed community where there is no physical or geographi-
cal connection within the group, only the strong shared choice of interest and identity. It is known that 
hackers and hacktivists create social groups that provide expertise, support, and training within their 
communities (Jordan & Taylor, 1998:757). This being the case, the social psychological processes have a 
strong influence on the internal group behaviours, as well as their interaction with other groups. Studies 
investigating unifying identity traits have emphasised that the traditional stereotypes may not be as preva-
lent as previously believed (Jordan, 2001, Rogers, 2010, Tanczer, 2015). Along with these communities 
being divided by different aims and tasks, there are also cultural divisions to be acknowledged, although 
it is not as clear how big an impact these differences make. Groups with different cultural backgrounds 
and opposing causes will still use the same hacktivist techniques. For example the Syrian Electric Army, 
a group that supported the Assad Syrian government in 2011, used website defacements, spamming, and 
electronic surveillance against their opponents, such as the Western media (Perlroth, 2013), hijacking 
headlines and Twitter accounts to communicate their messages.
THEN AND NOW: MASS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Mass social movements were historically regarded as being negatively influenced by personal elements 
of self-esteem or satisfaction with life. It was believed that personality attributes such as “impotence, 
selfishness and boredom characterised the…individuals prone to join mass movements” (Travaligno, 
2014:5). In the 20th century however, with the closer study of such movements, and the growth in popu-
larity and public support, these activities became regarded as more of a symptom that something was 
wrong in society (Travaligno, 2014), for example the movements for civil rights and anti-war protests 
in the USA. These periods emphasised the differences between the academic explanations for mass 
Table 2. Common Hacktivist tactics
Denial of Service attack (DoS attack) Using one computer and one internet connection the targeted server is overloaded by repeated requests. This makes the server unreachable to others, thus blocking the website.
          Distributed Denial of Service attack 
          (DDoS attack)
Many computers and many connections from all over the world (sometimes in botnets) are 
used to overwhelm the server with requests.
Site redirects Site redirects send visitors from the target website to another website of the hacktivists choosing.
Information theft
Involves unauthorised access to a computer or network and stealing data. The illegality 
of information theft is unambiguous despite its wide acceptance among hacktivists 
(Hampson, 2012).
Site defacements
With unauthorised access to a web server the hacktivist replaces or alters the web page 
to convey their message. This is the most common and usually least damaging form of 
hacktivism (Solomon, 2017).
Viruses and malware Viruses and other malware can be used as a means of sabotage, infiltration or even making a political statement.
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social movements, and the reality that was being witnessed. These significant contributions marked 
the departure from classic views of masses and crowds as irrational and disorganised (Gamson, 1975; 
Jenkins, 1985; cited in Travaligno, 2014). In fact, there developed socio-psychological models which 
showed that social movements were “more likely to emerge under conditions of structural stability, 
social connectedness and favourable mobilisation of resources” (Travaligno, 2014:5). Protesters came 
to be understood as rational actors, who weighed the cost and benefit of participating in such protests.
As such, it has been assumed that those involved in social movements, including hacktivism, will be 
equally rational actors. Within hacktivist groups, the entry requirements no longer entail elite computing 
knowledge, and those wanting to participate in hacking and hacktivism now can find multiple resources 
in seconds through search engines; it is similarly quick and easy to download computing tools written by 
others. Groups like Anonymous have been proponents of such techniques, making it simpler for people to 
be involved, and using strength in numbers rather than a smaller group of experts. The forms of hacktivist 
groups are dictated by the medium used; the internet allows them to exist in a decentralised “community 
without structure” (Leach, 2009:1059). As such, the most common feature across different groups is a 
consensus-based based approach to their activities. For the most part this means that through necessity 
hacktivist groupings are still relatively small, and regulated by trust and loyalty (Milan & Atton, 2015).
It has been suggested that some individuals, often adolescents and young adults, become involved in 
the activities of groups associated with cybersecurity incidents without a clear understanding of the risks 
involved (Olsen, 2012, Wolfradt & Doll, 2001); therefore they have not fully understood the relationship 
between the cost and benefit of their involvement in the groups. This participation and subsequent arrest 
of adolescents and young adults has continued with events such as the TalkTalk hack (Farrell, 2016) 
and the hacking collective “Crackas with Attitude” (Whitehead, 2016). It is now being recognised that 
cybercrime is a societal issue, with the UK’s National Crime Agency running campaigns to educate 
young people about the dangers of getting involved in cybercrime (NCA, 2016). However the confu-
sion surrounding the internet and international law, and the fact that many laws pre-date the widespread 
and versatile use of the internet, means that even those wishing to remain on the side of the law when 
engaging in hacktivism may struggle to find relevant legislation.
Social Protest or Hacking Crime?
Social movements can be defined as broad and informal networks of interaction, that participate inde-
pendently in collective action which is “motivated by a shared concern about a particular set of political 
issues…but not separately from governmental institutions” (Meuleman & Boushel, 2014:50). Social 
movement organisations refer to many different types, ranging from formal, organised institutions to 
the radically informal, from the local to the global (Meuleman & Boushel, 2014). This in turn requires 
the recognition of the cultural differences that may be present between all those involved, whether par-
ticipants or targets.
It is agreed that there must be certain characteristics in order for these networks to be categorised 
as a social movement; Although there is a wide diversity of forms of social protest, analysis of these 
forms by Hanna et al (2016) suggests they have only seven functions (purposes). The purposes overlap, 
and an individual protest action may seek to achieve several of these purposes. Most protests involve 
the coordination of many activities or forms of protest and exist in a nested hierarchy as part of a wider 
campaign within a social movement.
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Bearing this in mind, hacktivist groups can claim to meet these criteria as a social movement. When 
using the internet for activism, Vegh et al. (2003) suggest that are two forms— internet-based and inter-
net-enhanced. In internet-based activism, such as hacktivism or digital sit-ins, the internet is where the 
protest occurs. Internet-enhanced activism however is more about the organisation of the protest than any 
fundamental change to the protest itself. Solomon argues that there is “in reality little distinction between 
hacktivism and traditional protests” (2017:11), reasoning that hacktivists state similar motivations (a 
political or social cause), suggesting that hacktivists view themselves as working with more traditional 
protesters. An example of this was during the Arab Spring in 2011, where protesters physically present 
in Tunisia were aided via the internet by members of Anonymous when the government blocked access 
to the internet (Goode, 2015).
It has also been argued that hacktivism is the progression of social protest (Kubitschko, 2015, Pos-
till, 2014, Solomon, 2017), with protest moving from the physical world into cyberspace, as are many 
other traditional activities, such as shopping and banking. Some hacktivists regard their work itself as 
comparable to a physical sit-in protest (Jordan, 2015), with others making their protests through social 
media sites (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012, Valenzuela, 2013). It is suggested that there is potentially a need 
to protect and legitimise to some of the less controversial forms of hacktivism (Douglas et al, 2017, 
Solomon, 2017), acknowledging that the right to protest is protected by international human rights. 
There are articles which protect freedom of opinion and expression and covers developments in ICT, 
interpreted to ‘include all forms of audio-visual as well as electronic and Internet-based modes of ex-
pression.’ (UN Assembly, 1966). For this to apply to hacktivism there must be features, such as clear 
communication, which distinguishes this type of civil disobedience from radical protest. Douglas et al 
(2017) state that the civil disobedience of hacktivism must achieve the following: 1) provoke a political 
or social response; 2) allow that change is possible within the existing social and political structure. 
In this way, they argue, even a controversial tactic of a DDoS attack may be classified an act of civil 
obedience, despite being an illegal action, as in some cases it has the aim of communicating dissent to 
the public conscientious motivation.
It has been noted that hackers seem to be less motivated by their values and more by what they dislike 
(Madarie, 2017); the same could be observed of social media website users (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012, 
Table 3. Social movement characteristics
1. Information To distribute information to the wider public in order to raise awareness about ‘the cause’ or the situation that is the subject of protest.
2. Fundraising To raise funds to support the campaign.
3. Publicity To gain publicity (media attention) through the undertaking of actions usually having a performative dimension.
4. Mobilization To enlist participants for a specific protest event or campaign.
5. Solidarity building To build solidarity (unity and commitment) and a sense of worth amongst protesters and toward the protest cause in general.
6. Political pressure To apply pressure, through direct or indirect targeting, on authorities or decision-makers regarding their action/decision on a specific issue.
7. Direct action To cause immediate disruption to a specific project (e.g. a blockade), usually performed as acts of civil disobedience.
(Hanna et al, 2016)
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Valenzuela, 2013). Whilst hacktivism is primarily committed through individual action, such as coding 
and hacking, these actions gain meaning in the interaction with peers (Douglas et al, 2017).
Case Study: Anonymous and Lulzsec
Possibly the most infamous hacktivist group is the one known as Anonymous. With its origins on 4chan, 
the group started by pranking and “trolling” other online (and offline) communities, for entertainment. 
Over time this evolved in to people trying to use this group activity for “good” causes. This eventually 
led to a division in the group; those who wanted to prank and enjoy the “lulz”, and those who wanted 
to be “white knights” (see Coleman (2014) for more details).
As participation within Anonymous became more about political and social causes, rather than just 
mischief making, many of those who became involved in hacktivism cited their motivation as a desire 
to counteract the increase in surveillance and repression of such activities (Coleman, 2014, Douglas et 
al, 2017). Anonymous has used these motivations as a recruitment tactic, manipulating publicity, both 
negative and positive, to draw attention and support. This policy however has attracted criticism, due to 
the imprisonment of a number of hacktivists who took part in large operations, as well as a general lack 
of transparency and poor accountability from the group (Douglas et al, 2017). This is an example of the 
problems in hacktivism where groups, Anonymous especially, have always maintained that they do not 
have leaders and hierarchy (Coleman, 2014).
The hacks or “operations” carried out by Anonymous have ranged from simple pranks to serious 
on going campaigns. For the past few years, the name or brand has almost exclusively been used for 
hacktivism; those who claim Anonymous involvement in causes that do not meet the criteria have been 
denounced publicly, often through official Twitter accounts. This has in turn led to a lot of in fight-
ing, as some argue that there are no leaders, therefore no one can decide who is or is not a member of 
Anonymous. One of the methods the group uses to monitor and control group membership is assertive 
speech; it is the mode of communication not the speaker that matters; therefore by using and maintain-
ing control via social media accounts, this is how they get the message across to others. The group has 
also been noted for their controversial control of group identity, and have doxed individuals (revealing 
their real life identity and personal information), revoking their Anonymous membership (Dobusch & 
Schoeneborn, 2015).
Anonymous are a contentious topic; some members feel they made serious contributions to bringing 
hacktivism to the fore of current activism and protest, other commentator and critics feel it was a group 
of children and “wannabes” causing trouble, meaning the Anonymous has, at one point or another, been 
categorised as being relevant to all the terms in Table 1. Regardless of which argument is supported, it 
cannot be denied that Anonymous did draw attention and awareness to the importance of cyber-security.
Case Study: The Chaos Computer Club (CCC)
The Chaos Computer Club (CCC) is Europe’s oldest and one of the world’s largest hacker organizations 
– and they have a very different approach to Anonymous. Created via a newspaper advert in 1981, the 
CCC started as a loose group of individuals, but formally became a not-for profit association in 1984, 
with continued interactions with institutions and political organisations (Kubitschko, 2015). This active 
decision to remain legal in the face of “anti-hacking” government legislation is one of the most interesting 
elements about this group. The group describes itself as a non-governmental, non-partisan, not-for-profit, 
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and voluntary-based club that is sustained by membership fees and donations (Kubitschko, 2015). The 
CCC supports the principles hacker ethic (Levy, 2010) which stresses openness, sharing, decentraliza-
tion, free access to computers and world improvement, as well as advocating more transparency in 
government, communication as a human right (Coleman, 2011, Kubitschko, 2015, Nissenbaum, 2004).
What makes the CCC significantly different to other hacker collectives is not their political dimen-
sion but their insistence on working as a legitimately recognised collective, even if they use illegitimate 
methods. One of the Club’s aims is to teach the public to use technological skills and bring about po-
litical change. The groups hacks include exposing flaws in financial and political areas; for example in 
1984, CCC members exploited a security flaw which allowed them to transfer 135,000 Deutschmark 
(ca. €68,000) from a German savings bank to their own (Kubitschko, 2015). The money was transferred 
back immediately and the flaw reported. The group has been involved in hacks which have either been 
a grey are or clearly illegal; this led to a period of decline in popularity in the 1990s. Within this group 
there appears to be the need to continue their legitimacy within the state of Germany, which struggled 
when members were conflicted about the group methods. The group rejuvenated itself in the 2000s, 
demonstrating flaws in a voting computer system that was in use in several countries and exposing the 
vulnerability of biometric identity systems. In 2011 they published an analysis of a malware program in 
use by the German police, which was used for surveillance; this highlighted the ability for the computer 
to be controlled remotely, as well as able to activate the microphone or camera (Kubitschko, 2015). It is 
emphasised that the CCC has a reputation for expertise, which they believe needs to be brought to the 
established centres of power by engaging with politicians, legislators and judges, (Kubitschko, 2015), 
because for the CCC, hacktivism is only one part of their purpose (Coleman, 2014, Kubischko, 2015).
SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
As with all cyber-interactions, hacktivism occurs within a social context. As more individuals become 
involved in online communities relating to hacktivism, more groups develop and work together, and 
so the growth of potential online influence over individuals strengthens. This growth, especially in 
regard to social and ideological motivations, has been attributed in part to the fact that there is now a 
generation raised that has never known the world without the technology and innovation we have now 
(Seebruck, 2015), with increased user generated content increasing the confidence and perception of 
power individuals possess.
There are those who contend that online communication loses meaning and significance in under-
standing, due to the lack of visual face-to-face clues and prompts (Suler, 2004); this also however al-
lows a group identity to develop, with its own language, and norms that group participants use to signal 
membership (Dobusch & Schoeneborn, 2015, McKenna & Green, 2002). These are strong contributors 
to the formation of an online collective identity and there is still a significant amount of social informa-
tion available to help users decipher meaning that is not plainly stated. Similarly, Postmes & Brunsting 
dispute the statement that computers damage social ties (Turkle, 1999), arguing to the contrary, that it 
has been observed that the Internet “strengthens existing social movements, stimulates the formation 
of new ones, and mobilizes sizable numbers of people for collective action,” (Postmes & Brunsting, 
2002:294). There are various studies on the motivations of those who engage in hacking, ranging from 
financial gain, prestige, curiosity (Seebruck, 2015). These however have not found to be the strongest 
indicator of the occurrence of participation; when it comes to hacking related involvement it is the “social 
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motivators (i.e., peer recognition/respect and team-play) and not the personal motivators (i.e., intellectual 
challenge/curiosity and justice) that are relevant to the frequency of involvement” (Madarie, 2017:93).
Intergroup attribution research (Branscombe & Wann, 1994, Cialdini et al, 1976, Hewstone & Jaspars, 
1982, Ho & Lloyd, 1982, Tarrant & North, 2004) has shown that the achievements of group actions can 
strengthen individual members’ beliefs that their group and members are highly skilled. It can also lead 
group members to attribute the success of opposing groups to external circumstances and luck. This has 
been thought to encourage online groups to carry out additional actions in hacktivism and against other 
cyber adversarial groups, especially if the group identity is reinforced, either by the actions involved 
(combining tactics shown in Tables 2 & 3) or by the subsequent media reporting. It has been observed 
that early news reports about Anonymous generally exaggerated the cohesiveness between members 
and the organisational structure of the group (Olson, 2012), which has then contributed to the group 
becoming more cohesive and organised.
The cohesiveness of newer hacking collectives was affected in 2012 by the exposure of a high profile 
member of Lulzsec, Sabu, as having been an informant for the FBI. His information led to the arrests 
of prominent group members in the USA, the UK and Ireland. There have been significant changes to 
the group behaviours since (Coleman, 2015), with greater antipathy of ‘leader-fags’, or those wanting to 
take charge, suspicion of new or unknown members, and of any one who seems to be desiring attention. 
This is despite repeated claims from groups such as Anonymous that they do not have an official leader 
or hierarchy (Coleman, 2014). This may or may not be the case, but regardless it is relevant that many 
members of such collectives believe this to be true, which potentially leaves them open to manipulation. 
After all, the creation of the internet was heavily influenced by those who wished to see technology move 
towards a “decentralised, and non-hierarchical version of society,” (Rosenzweig, 1998:1552), and so those 
that follow these ideals may prefer to believe that a non-hierarchy has been achieved, a form of confirma-
tion bias. It cannot be assumed that there is a complete lack of hierarchy in these communities, as there 
are obvious examples, especially in forums or Internet-Relay Chat (IRC) channels where it is necessary 
for administrators to moderate the content submitted by users (Dupont et al, 2016, Uitermark, 2016).
Another social element within these communities is the behavioural consequences of trust. Trusting 
behaviour requires the individual to relinquish control over valuable outcomes with the expectation that 
the other will reciprocate. On the internet many will openly talk about not trusting others, as there is no 
way to verify claims. Within hacktivism however, it has been shown that group membership is a strong 
predictor of trusting behaviour (Tanis & Postmes, 2005). Therefore, those who join a particular group 
or share a hacktivist identity are more inclined to trust other group members with no other influencing 
factor. Generalised trust is also believed to make a person more willing to engage in collective efforts 
and cooperate with other people (Sturgis et al, 2012, Van Lange, 2015), thereby encouraging individuals 
to take part in hacktivist tactics (see Table 2).
Online disinhibition effect is the removal or reduction of the social and psychological restraints 
that individuals experience in everyday face to face interaction (Suler, 2004, Hu et al, 2015, Joinson, 
2007, Lapidot-Lefler & Barak, 2015). It could be argued that anonymity and online disinhibition can 
be positive, allowing the internet to be an open place where individuals can be honest on subjects that 
they may otherwise not wish to be identified with (McKenna & Green, 2002). This privacy combined 
with openness is what many involved in hacking and hacktivism claim to want to protect (Levy, 2010).
Within investigations into the elements that predict involvement or carrying out hacktivist actions, 
there is often a heavy focus on adolescents (Harris-McKoy & Cui, 2013, Wilcox et al, 2003, Wright et al, 
2015). Unsurprisingly, one of the strongest factors predicting the change of cyber delinquency in young 
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people was the amount of computer use (Wilcox et al, 2003, Wright, et al, 2015). This, combined with 
further studies, has led some to claim that there is a parental responsibility that needs to be acknowledged; 
a study in Korea concluded that to avoid computer delinquency parents should take responsibility for 
educating their children about the negative outcomes of illegal or criminal behaviours (Harris-McKoy 
& Cui, 2013). This is similar to an awareness raising campaign launched by the NCA (2015) in the UK, 
urging parents to be conscious of what their children might be doing online, and being aware of the 
legality of their actions.
Such studies as Harris-McKoy and Cui (2013) also highlight the importance of considering cultural 
differences and approaches. There has been a trend to place more importance on cognitive factors, look-
ing at the cognitive influence on individual perception of risk, which has meant that cultural and social 
influences are sometimes neglected. The Cultural Theory of Risk however explains that social structures 
are associated with individual perceptions of societal dangers. Depending on the community and social 
structures people are used to and the values and social norms they have been taught, people understand 
risks differently. This means that the values of certain social or cultural contexts shape the individual’s 
perception and evaluation of risks (Rippl, 2002). For example, at a higher level, Eastern cultures stress 
group solidarity and relationships with other people; Western cultures emphasize the self and autonomy 
(Wright et al, 2015). The extent to which this is evident in hacking groups is still not known but it must 
be considered as a factor.
Groupthink is another significant offline group phenomenon must be considered in the online group 
context (Packer, 2009). Janis (1972) defines groupthink as the psychological drive for consensus at any 
cost that suppresses is agreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making 
groups. He also identified the symptoms of Groupthink, which transpire when a group tries to make 
decisions. These include the illusion of invulnerability; collective rationalisation; stereotyped views of 
different groups; group pressure to conform; and self-censorship (Janis, 1972). Although groupthink does 
not always occur, it is more common when the groups are highly cohesive, especially in high-pressure 
situations. When there is pressure for agreement it has been found that group members can be more 
vulnerable to inaccurate and irrational thinking; as such decisions formed by groupthink have reduced 
probability of attaining successful outcomes (Janis, 1972). This has been seen in some hacktivist attempts, 
such as the manipulation of individuals to download and use software for DDoS attacks (The Paypal 14, 
see Coleman, 2014), with little information given and reassurance from other group members that this 
was a good and constructive action to take for the benefit of their cause. In the case of the PayPal 14, 
the individuals were later arrested and prosecuted by the US government (Coleman, 2014).
COGNITIVE FACTORS
As the significance of psychology becomes more widely acknowledged within the fields of comput-
ing and security, the cognitive factors influencing human behaviour must be re-examined. There are a 
number of acknowledged biases and heuristics that affect how individuals perceive and understand their 
surroundings. This section will discuss some of the more common ones that influence decision making 
and judgement.
There have been many concerns as computing and technology advanced that the “overuse of com-
puters may have a deleterious effect on cognitive functioning” (Vujic, 2017:152). Theoretical-based 
predictions have so far supported the view that computer and Internet use can have a negative impact 
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on short-term memory processing and sustained attention (Vujic, 2017). This has spread to the public 
perception that internet and computer use impair cognitive abilities, and encourage “lazy” patterns of 
thinking, particularly affecting memory and concentration (Nasi & Koivusilta, 2013). It has been identi-
fied that “the quality of computer use may be just as important as the measuring the quantity of computer 
use” (Vujic, 2017:159). This suggests that those who use computers over long periods of time daily are 
at greater risk of greater biased cognition, as well as lower attention (Tsohou et al, 2015, Vujic, 2017).
There have however also been studies that suggest evidence of a positive relationship between interac-
tive computer use and cognitive performance (Small et al, 2009, Tun & Lachman, 2010, Vujic, 2017). 
Comparing a computer/internet “savvy” group and a net “naïve” group, the results revealed the internet 
“savvy” individuals experienced double the activity increase in the areas of the brain associated with 
complex reasoning, decision making and visual processing (Small et al., 2009). One explanation for 
these differences was the concept different “systems” of processing information. The first “System 1” 
or “bottom-up” is theorised to be automatic, unconscious, heuristic responses with minimal resources; 
“System 2” or “top-down” is considered resource-intensive and attention driven (Evans, 2003, Slovic et 
al, 2002, Vujic, 2017), requiring more mental effort, which is harder to sustain.
When it comes decision making and judgements, individuals have been found to over-rely on heuristics 
such as such as availability, and anchoring, therefore using simplified strategies to make choices (Tver-
sky, 1972), without recognising the bias. The availability heuristic implies that in any decision-making 
process, easily remembered information is given greater weight by decision makers. In this way, recent 
events and vivid memories are given more importance by the individuals or groups as they are easier 
to recall (Tsohou et al, 2015), which allows potentially inaccurate information to be the basis of their 
decision. In a numerical comparison, anchoring is when an individual’s numerical estimate is influenced 
toward an arbitrary value. Final estimations are strongly swayed by the initial value provided, making it 
easier to manipulate individuals when giving them initial information (Tsohou et al, 2015).
The affect heuristic is when an individual makes judgments and decisions quickly based on their 
emotional impressions. A common outcome of the affect heuristic is that people tend to underestimate 
risks and costs connected with things they like, and overestimate the risks and costs when they are 
related to things they dislike (Tsohou et al, 2015). Similarly, confirmation bias is where people tend to 
seek information that is consistent with their current hypothesis and are unlikely to seek information 
expected to be inconsistent with it (Chapman and Johnson, 2002, Tsohou et al, 2015). This is sometimes 
seen in social movement behaviours (see Table 3), where members will not look for external sources of 
information, trusting the other group members (as per generalised trust). Confirmation bias is considered 
to be one of the most prominent biases affecting decision making (Kahneman et al., 2011).
These attributes and biases are present in hacktivist groups, with many accounts from Anonymous 
members or former members having examples of optimism bias. Optimism bias leads individuals have 
a consistent tendency to believe that they are less at risk of experiencing a negative event themselves 
compared to others (Tsohou et al, 2015), therefore even if they did take part in an illegal activity they 
would be at less risk of being tracked by law enforcement agencies. This has been disproved through the 
arrests of those involved in Lulzsec, the PayPal 14, the TalkTalk hack, and Crackas with Attitude (Cole-
man, 2014, Farrell, 2016, Olsen, 2012, Whitehead, 2016). When recounting their individual experiences 
within the groups, the individuals stated that they were aware of the risk, aware that they were carrying 
out illegal actions but felt that they would not be caught, in part because they were aware of the risk and 
“it wouldn’t happen to them” (Olsen, 2012, Coleman, 2014).
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided a brief introduction to hacktivism and social protest online, and highlighted 
some of the socio-psychological and cognitive factors that can lead to individuals taking part in hacktiv-
ism groups. As stated, hacktivism is an ill-defined area which some people claim as a legitimate form of 
protest in the online world, and others regard as illegal hacking; there is truth to both arguments. Those 
who believe it should be protected will continue to work for it to be recognised. In terms of further study 
this area has a lot of potential for future research. The depth of social ties and influence is still being 
examined; and whilst cognitive biases are recognised, strategies to mitigate and combat the vulnerability 
they present are still being developed. What is clear from many studies and examples is that hackers are 
often skilled and intelligent individuals, who can offer a lot of knowledge and information. As the world 
continues to become more integrated with the online world, their knowledge and skill becomes even 
more valuable. The policies and laws that govern the internet need to be made with a greater awareness 
of the online world, and steps should be taken to protect the internet as the free, open and invaluable 
resource that it is.
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